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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No,
14471

-vsEDWIN MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant•

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged in the Third District
Court with the crime of aggravated robbery, a felony of
the first degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried on an information alleging
that he robbed Brenda Bradley and Barbara Harris, and in so
doing, used a deadly weapon or a facsimile thereof, to-wit:
a revolver, on January 8, 1976. A jury returned a verdict
of guilty.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order from this Court
reversing the verdict of the trial court and granting
appellant a new trial.

Respondent urges that the trial

court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OP FACTS
Brenda Bradley testified that in the afternoon
of June 30, 1975, she and three of her children, ages
six to fifteen, visited at the residence of a friend,
Barbara Harris, located at 114 4 South Second East in
Salt Lake City (T.16,17).

Also present in the duplex

that afternoon were, according to several testimonies,
Barbara Harris and her three young children, Pat and
Ship Timms and their two children, Debby Harris, and
Willy Harris (T.18,22).

Ms. Bradley testified that

she and Barbara Harris were preparing to drive to the
Utah State Prison to visit Ms.. Harris1
and Ms. Bradley's fiance (T.18).

husband

Because Ms. Harris

had planned to try to buy a car that same day, Ms.
Bradley further testified that she had brought with
her $138.00, all of which she was amenable to lending
Barbara, so that the purchase could be made (T.53).
According to Ms. Bradley, between three and four
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o'clock a man she knew only by the nickname "Littleman"
entered her home without knocking, accompanied by a second
man, whom she knew to be named Edwin (T.21,22).

Ms.

Bradley proceeded to make an in-court identification of
appellant and testified that she had identified "Littleman"
as Kenneth Wells from police photographs (T.20,69).
Ms. Bradley continued her testimony, stating
that both appellant and Wells held drawn guns and Wells
demanded money (T.22).

The victim testified that her

$138.00 was taken from her purse, along with other items,
including some traveler's checks, that appellant entered
Barbara's bedroom and reappeared holding some cash, which
he gave to Wells (T.25,46).

Wells also took money from

Ship Timms (T.26), and struck both Willy Harris and Ship
(T.27,28).

Before leaving, Wells cut the telephone wires

(T.62); the two men drove away in the car Willy Harris
had been using, Wells having taken the car keys from
Willy (T.27,28).
Ms. Bradley completed direct examination by
testifying that immediately following the robbery she
and Barbara Harris went over to Ms. Bradley's house to
calm down the frightened children and to have an older
child babysit their children while they visited
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Ms. Harris1 husband and Ms. Bradley's fiance at the
Utah State Prison.

She noted that they did not take

time to call the police until later that evening because
they did not want to miss the visiting period at the
Prison (T.30).
The State next called Kenneth Timms, who,
with his wife, had been a guest at the Harris home in
the afternoon of June 30, 1975, and who previously
had been an adult foster care family for Ms. Harris
(T.72-75).

Timms made an in-court identification of

appellant as one of two black men who invaded the
Harris home shortly after the Timmsf arrival and robbed
the persons present (T.76-77).

Although Timms1

testimony was that appellant did not have a gun in his
possession when he arrived, he did state that appellant
went into a bedroom and returned with a »22 caliber
revolver which Timms had hidden under a pillow, Timms
having earlier testified that he had brought the revolver
to show Ms. Harris, and had hidden it in the bedroom so the
children would not get it (T.79,85).

The witness then

testified that he had been struck in the head by the
second man, who cut the telephone wires and who took
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money ($2*00) and car keys from Timms, in addition to the
revolver taken by appellant (T.81,82).
Patricia Timms and Barbara testified in
substantially the same manner as the other witnesses
although Ms. Timms testified that appellant initially
had no gun while Ms. Harris testified*that appellant was
carrying a gun when he entered her home (T.114,135).
Detective Thomas Baron of the Tucson, Arizona,
Police Department, testified that on July 17, 1975, a
vehicle driven by Kenneth Wells was stopped by police
officers and that he had removed a revolver from the
area beneath the dashboard (T.273-275). Afterwards,
both Wells and appellant, who was in a nearby motel,
were taken into custody (T.273).

Edward Berry of the

Utah Motor Vehicle Department testified that the vehicle
in question was registered to Edward Wells (T.279), and
Kenneth Timms stated that that revolver looked like his
revolver which had been taken during the robbery.(T.281).
Appellant testified in his own behalf.

He

stated that he had gone to the Harris residence to
purchase heroin; that the heroin they purchased there
the afternoon of June 30, 197 5, was not good? that Ms. Harris
refused to give him back his purchase money, and that as he
and Kenneth Wells left, he grabbed a plastic bag with
several balloons of heroin in it and fled, a few days
-5-

later leaving the Salt Lake City area for Tucson,
Arizona (T.216-234).

Testifying in substantially the

same manner was Kenneth Wells, who further stated
that neither man took a gun into the house (T.198).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE A BILL OF PARTICULARS NEED NOT
REVEAL THE PROSECUTION'S ENTIRE CASE, THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY RECEIVED EVIDENCE NEITHER NAMED NOR DESCRIBED
IN THE INFORMATION OR BILL,
According to Utah Code A m u § 77-21-9 (1953),
as amended, a Bill of Particulars may be demanded by a
criminal defendant if the information or indictment
"fails to inform the defendant of the particulars of
the offense, sufficiently to enable him to prepare his
defense. • . ."

In the Bill provided by David Yocum,

a Deputy County Attorney for Salt Lake County (R.369-370),
the names and known addresses of all witnesses, including
those who would not be called to testify, were given.
The Bill also stated the time and place of the alleged
armed robbery:

approximately 4-4:30 p.m., June 30, 1975,

at 1144 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Finally,

the Bill named the entrance into that residence and the
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robbing of Barbara Harris and Brenda Moore Bradley of
specific sums of money by use of a revolver as the
acts which the State contended appellant did, along with
one Kenneth Wells*

Respondent contends that this detailed

information provided appellant with sufficient particularity
of the charges against him to enable appellant to prepare
his defense.

The omission of information about other monies

and items taken by appellant was proper as that evidence
was a vital part of the proof of the armed robbery of Ms.
Bradley and Ms. Harris, exempting it from disclosure,
requirements since appellant was not charged with robbery
of Mr. and Mrs. Timms or either of the Harrises. As
appellant's defense was a total denial of the robbery
charges coupled with an admission of theft of heroin at
that residence, his defense could not have been unfairly
prejudiced by the non-disclosure of this evidence, and
in factr appellant has been unable to demonstrate any
prejudice resulting from the non-disclosure.

Counsel

merely cries "foul" at the "surprise," being unable to
articulate the difference that such information would
have made in preparation of his defence*

If anyone knew

about the taking of Timms1 revolver, surely it was
appellant himself.
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The Utah Supreme Court has considered the
contents of Bills of Particulars on several occasions
and has consistently held valid Bills whose contents were
comparable to the instant one*

In State v. Lack, 118

Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950), the defendant demanded
copies of invoice sheets, ledgers, and other business
records.

This Court held:
". . • Sec. 105-21-9(1)
U.C.A. 1943, was designed to enable
a defendant to have stated the
particulars of the charge which
he must meet, where the short form
indictment or information is used.
It was not intended as a device to
compel the prosecution to give an
accused person a preview of the
evidence on which the state relies
to sustain the charge." Id. at 855.
In State v. Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134 P.2d 173

(1943), cited by appellant for another proposition, the
defendant in a carnal knowledge case wanted the exact time
of the incident, whether it was in or out of the car,
what other person was present, etc.

The Bill provided,

in pertinent parts
"On or about the 1st day of
September, A.D. 1940, at or near
the mouth of Hobble Creek Canyon in
Utah County, State of Utah, the
defendant Dewey Jameson, had
carnal knowledge of and sexual
intercourse with the body of M.N.
. . . ." Id. at 175.

The Court held that it was not error to refuse defendant's
requests as the Bill provided defendant sufficiently
informed him of the nature of the offense and the time and
place of its commission.
The United States Supreme Court considered this
issue in Wong Tai v. United Statesr 273 U.S. 77, 71 L.Ed.
545 (1927), when a defendant's request for a Bill of
Particulars was denied because he wanted a recitation of
all of the overt acts the government contended defendant
had performed.

The Court observed, in holding the denial

proper, that defendant in effect sought a complete discovery
of the government's case in reference to the overt acts and
that there was no evidence that defendant's substantial
rights were prejudiced in any way.

Ultimately, the Court

concluded that the granting of a motion for a Bill of
Particulars is within the sound discretion of the court and
if no abuse is shown, the decision of the trial court will
not be disturbed.
Respondent asserts that in the instant case
appellant was provided with ample information with which to
meet the charges and construct a defense as the omitted
information was merely evidence to substantiate and support
the armed robbery charges. No attempt was ever made by the
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prosecution to expand the information to include these
additional robbery charges.
Finally, even if, arguendo, the trial court
had ordered the prosecution to supply this information,
even though not statutorily required, the court could
have excused the failure to provide such material by
permitting the evidence to be introduced.

See State v.

Morraine, 25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P.2d 831 (1970).

Because

the trial court in the instant case never required an
amendment of the Bill or indicated that it was excusing
any failure on the State's part in providing information,
the necessary conclusion is that the trial court considered
the Bill sufficient.

As no abuse of the court's discre-

tion in so finding appears in the record, respondent
submits that that finding should remain undisturbed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW
DEFENSE COUNSEL TO CROSS-EXAMINE MS. BRADLEY REGARDING
HER ALLEGED USE OF HEROIN ON THE DAY OF THE ROBBERY.
During defense counsel1s cross-examination
of Brenda Bradley, he posed the following question:
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"On June 30, 1975, when this incident occurred, had
you used any heroin?"
court sustained*

The prosecution objected; the

Appellant claims that under Rule 20

of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the court should have
overruled the objection, as the answer may have
affected her credibility.
There are two related flaws in that analysis.
The initial flaw is that it is mere speculation on
defense counsel's part that the use of heroin by Ms.
Bradley would have distorted her perceptions of that
day.

Indeed, there was no testimony by any witness

remotely suggesting that on the day of the robbery,
Ms. Bradley was exhibiting abnormal speech or behavior.
Secondly, and most importantly, Rule 20 is
subject to the strictures of Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.

Even if defense counsel could demonstrate

some relevancy of that information to the issue of
her credibility, if the relevancy of that information
is outweighed by its undue prejudicial effect, the
evidence, otherwise admissible, can be excluded by the
court, for Rule 45 states in pertinent part:
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" . . . the judge may in his
discretion exclude evidence if
he finds that its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the
risk that its admission will . . .
(b) create substantial danger
of undue prejudice or of confusing
the issues or of misleading the
jury. . . . "
The note following the rule observes that this rule
applies in situations where collateral issues which
have only slight probative value but create

illegitmate

emotional appeal are injected into the proceedings.
Respondent submits that on this basis the objection
was properly sustained.
Had Ms. Bradley responded that she had used
heroin on the day in question, there is a strong
likelihood that some jurors would, on that basis alone,
have discredited her entire testimony because of
sleazy connotations of "hype" and "junkie" invoked
by the revelation that one is a heroin user.

Certainly

heroin users can be the victims of armed robberies,
and in this instance, the court properly refused to
allow questions whose thrust was to discredit a witness
on inappropriate and highly prejudicial grounds by
holding her out to the jury as an unreliable drug user.
Respondent suggests that any probative value based on
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Ms, Bradley's perceptions of the robbery events was
minimal because three subsequent prosecution witnesses
gave substantially the same descriptions of the events
that occurred during the robbery, suggesting that her
memory and perceptions of that day were as clear as the
others, none of whom was asked if he had used heroin.
State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795 (Utah 1975), is
relied upon by appellant.

That case can be easily

distinguished for the issue there was the appropriateness
of asking a defendant in a theft case if she was under
the influence of drugs at the time of her testimony.
That is an entirely different issue from the one this
case presents, for intoxication during testimony could
well affect coherency, speech, thought, etc., with the
elicited testimony perhaps being rambling, disjointed,
or even unintelligible.

Therefore, the issue was witness

competency, not credibility.
On these bases, the trial court properly
refused to allow defense

counsel to ask Ms. Bradley

about her alleged drug use.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT A
MISTRIAL, NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT HAVING OCCURRED.
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Appellant relies principally on State v,
Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 383 P.2d 407 (1963), and State
v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), in
his claim that he is due a new trial because of
prosecutorial misconduct in the corss-examination of
appellant and Kenneth Wells,

Respondent, however,

submits that those cases are distinguishable on
their facts and that the record contains no support
for appellant's allegation that the only purpose for
such cross-examination was to "disgrace the defendant
or show his propensity to commit crime,"
In Kazda, supra, a third party was allowed
to testify about admission of other crimes that the
defendant had made, even though defendant's commission
of those crimes was as yet unproven.

This Court properly

held such in-depth examination of a third party to be
prejudicial error as the clear intent of that interrogation was to demonstrate defendant's proclivity to
commit crimes*
In Dickson, supra, where the cross-examination
of the defendant included the probing of a robbery that
had occurred in Texas subsequent to the robbery in
Salt Lake City with which the defendant was charged, the

-14-

Utah Supreme Court determined that the only fact adduced
from that cross-examination was that the witness had been
charged with such a crime and held once again that "such
evidence is not admissible if its effect is merely to
disgrace the defendant or show his propensity to commit
crime."

Id. at 412.
In the instant case the prosecution attempted

no in-depth pursuit of information concerning the Tucson
robbery charge (later dismissed) against Mr. Wells, Since
Wells had previously testified that he and appellant had
left the jurisdiction and were subsequently picked up by
the police in Tucson, Arizona (T.202-204), it was relevant
to inquire about how he came to return to Utah (arrested
on robbery charge, dismissed, extradited to Utah via
fugitive warrant outstanding for probation violation)
(T.206).

Furthermore, two of the State's witnesses

had testified that both appellant and Wells were carrying
a gun when they entered the Second East residence.
Therefore, an admission by Wells or appellant concerning
possession of a revolver other than the .22 caliber pistol
owned by Timms would have been helpful to the State.
However, both Wells and appellant summarily denied
knowledge or possession of a second gun (T.215,222), and
the matter was dropped.
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The scope of these cross-examinations was
well within permissible limits*

Questions related to

Tucson activities were but a small part of extensive
cross-examinations, whose main focus was a description
of events that occurred during the robbery at the Harris
home.

The trial court maintained control of the

proceedings and in some instances did sustain defense
objections to improper prosecution questions.

Appellant

has been unable to demonstrate any prejudice resulting
from prosecution questioning.

With four eyewitnesses

to the Salt Lake robbery testifying for the prosecution,
creating a solid case against appellant, especially in
light of the recovery from Wells1 car of the .22 caliber
pistol belonging to eyewitness Timms, the county attorney
would have been extremely foolhardy

to have jeopardized

such a strong case by intentionally using cross-examination
for purposes that would have constituted reversible error
on appeal.
Respondent contends that because Kazda and
Dickson do not settle this case, the appropriate rule is
found in State v. Bellwood, 27 Utah 2d 214, 494 P.2d 519
(1972); State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804
(1972); and Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward,
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10 Utah 2d 69, 347 P.2d 862 (1959); all three cases
concerning trial court discretion and cross-examination.
In Bellwood, supra, Justice Tuckett, writing for the
Court (with justices concurring and one concurring in
the granting of a new trial)r stated that the scope of
cross-examination of a defendant by a prosecutor is
largely within the discretion of the trial court and
that the Utah Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere
unless there is abuse of discretion*

The appellant in

that case received a new trial because his cross-examination
by the prosecutor went to his punishment, rather than h.s
guilt or innocence.
In Anderson, supra, this Court held that the
extent, of cross-examind:ion is a matter which lies within
the sound discretion of the trial judge, 3 rule discussed
years earlier in Weber Basin, supra, where the Court
observed that even though the trial judge generally has
discretion to control cross-examination within reasonable
limitations, "he should not so reject it as to prevent
inquiry into matters having a direct bearing upon the
vital issues."

Id. at 865.

Based on these considerations, respondent
urges that this Court defer to the judgment of the trial
court, no abuse of its discretion having been demonstrated.
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POINT IV
EVIDENCE BY WAY OF IMPEACHMENT IS IMPROPER
ON A POINT NOT PROPERLY IN EVIDENCE.
Appellant claims that his right to due
process of law required that a former Salt Lake City
Police Department undercover narcotics agent be
allowed to testify that three months subsequent to the
armed robbery he purchased heroin from Barbara Harris.
He attempts to make the agentfs testimony sufficiently
relevant by showing its inconsistency with the testimony
of Ms. Harris, wherein she stated that she had never
sold heroin.

Appellant contends that the agent's

testimony would prove Ms. Harris to be a liar, and as her
credibility is an issue, such testimony ought to be
received.
Even if, arguendo, the agent testified exactly
as expected, respondent submits that the testimony would
still be inadmissible under a well recognized rule that
a witness cannot be contradicted or impeached by facts
collateral to the issue.

English jurisprudence has long

recognized the necessity for such a rule, the Earl of
Castlemaine's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 1067, 1081, 1107
(1680), being but one early example.

On an offer to

contradict on a collateral matter, the following discourse
occurred:
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"Earl of Castlemaine's Trial,
7 How. St. Tr. 1067, 1081, 1107
(1680) (on an offer to contradict
on a collateral matter): AttorneyGeneral; If he may ask questions
about such foreign matters as this,
no man can justify himself; . . .
any man may be catched thus.
Defendant; How can a man be
catched in the truth? L.C^J.
SCROGGS; We are not hearken to it.
The reason is this, first; You must
have him perjured, and we are not
now to try whether that thing sworn
in another place be true or false;
because that is the way to accuse
whom you please, and that may make a
man a liar that cannot imagine this
will be put to him; and so no man's
testimony that comes to be a witness
shall leave himself safe."
A later English case, Attorney-General v. Hitchcock,
1. Exch. 91, 104 (1847), has been cited approvingly as providing
the policy rationale for excluding contradictory testimony on
a collateral issue;
"ALDERSON, B., in Attorney-General
v. Hitchcock, 1. Exch. 91, 104 (1847);
When the question is not relevant,
strictly speaking, to the issue, but
tending to contradict the witness,
his answer must be taken (although it
tends to show that he in that particular
instance speaks falsely, and although
it is [thus] not altogether immaterial
to the issue) for the sake of the general
public convenience; for great inconvenience
would follow from a continual course of
those sorts of cross-examinations which
would be let in the case of a witness
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being called for the purpose of
contradiction. ROLFE, B.: The
laws of evidence on this subject,
as to what ought and what ought not
to be received, must be considered
as founded on a sort of comparative
consideration of the time to be
occupied in examinations of this
nature and the time which it is
practicable to bestow upon them.
If we lived for a thousand years,
instead of about sixty or seventy,
and every case were of sufficient
importance, it might be possible and
perhaps proper to throw a light on
matters in which every possible question
might be suggested, for the purpose of
seeing by such means whether the whole
was unfounded, or what portion of it was
not, and to raise every possible inquiry
as to the truth of the statements made.
But I do not see how that could be; in
fact, mankind find it to be impossible.
Therefore some line must be drawn."
Given this English birth and heritage, the
established American rule in courts that have considered
the matter is that American courts too will not receive
such testimony into evidence.

Although the Utah Supreme

Court does not appear to have ever decided this exact
point, several neighboring states have, and all have held
inadmissible this kind of evidence.

See:

State v. Mundell,

66 Idaho 298, 158 P,2d 818 (1945); Dewey v. Funk, 211 Kan.
54, 505 P.2d 722 (1973); Banta v. Superior Court of Maricopa
County, 112 Ariz. 544, 544 P.2d 653 (1976); Holland v. Briggs,
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532 P.2d 411 (Mont. 1975); and State v. Gardner, 16 Or.
App. 464, 518 P.2d 1341, cert, denied 95 S.Ct. 313.
As the general rule is conceded everywhere,
the critical issue becomes whether the evidence sought
to be introduced is collateral or material.

State v.

Johnson, 192 Wash. 467, 73 P.2d 1342 (1937), provides a
test in its holding that the cross-examiner is bound
by the response given by the witness:
"A witness cannot be impeached
by showing falsity of his testimony
concerning facts collateral to the
issue, but a party cross-examining
a witness as to such matters is
concluded by the answers given. . .
Whether a matter is material or
collateral . . . depends on whether
the party cross-examining the witness
is entitled to prove it in support of
his case." rd. at 1344.
In Wigmore's words, "could the fact, as to
which error is predicated, have been shown in evidence
for any purpose independently of the contradiction?"
IIIA Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn Revision), p. 961,
§ 1003.
Respondent contends that in the instant
case it would be merely collateral as to whether Ms.
Harris ever sold heroin and lied about having sold the
narcotic.

Appellant was charged with armed robbery
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and whether the victim of that armed robbery had sold
heroin and subsequently lied about it is immaterial.
However, in a prosecution of Ms. Harris for selling
narcotics, the undercover agent*s testimony would then
become vital.

At pages 248 and 249 of the transcript,

counsel for appellant admitted that his only purpose
in seeking to have the agent testify was to show that
Ms. Harris had lied under oath about selling heroin.
Respondent submits that this testimony
would not pass the Wigmore, Attorney-General v. Hitchcock,
or State v. Johnson tests of materiality.

Because the

agent's testimony could not have been properly received
during any other facet of the trial, the court properly
ruled that it was inadmissible in this attempt to suggest
that Ms. Harris had perjured herself.

Ms. Harris was not

on trial, and whether she was dishonest about selling
drugs was an issue to be determined at her own trial,
not appellant's. Additionally, a further policy reason
to exclude this type of collateral contradictory testimony
was the severe prejudicial effect such an allegation might
have on the jury.

Drug dealers are generally not held

in high repute by the local citizenry, and leveling those
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allegations at Ms. Harris may well have unfairly
prejudiced the jury to disregard her entire testimony,
believing that drug dealers—an accusation which has not
been proven—deserve to have bad thing happen to them,
including armed robbery.
CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments contained herein,
respondent urges the Court to affirm the verdict of
the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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